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1A. Introduction
1. SSA Record: Uneven 1970s/Disastrous 1980's
2. Features Include:
Falling Output Per Capita (only slightly, unevenly and 
fragilely slowed in the past four years)
Falling Earned Import Capacity (Real Exports/Deflated by 
Terms of Trade)
Falling Food Production Per Capita (dating to mid-1960s)
Falling Real Government Service Expenditure Per Capita 
Rapidly Rising Real External Debt Burden
Substantial Decrease in Real Income of Poor Households, and 
Increase in Percentage Living in Absolute Poverty 
Increased National and Household Economic Vulnerability
to further shocks
3. Whatever the causes, the generality of these features since
1979 indicates need for structural adjustment:
Of production 
Of investment
Of scarce resource allocation 
Of budget structures (sources and uses)
Of import/export levels
Of access to basic services
Of income and production distribution
4. The reasons for present weakness are relevant, but 
primarily for assessing how to design structural adjustment 
not in casting blame or asserting that adjustment can be 
avoided or achieved by a re-run of 1974-76 or 1976-79 
policies.
5. Structural adjustment must be grounded in national contexts 
and based on national analyses, decisions, commitments and 
personnel or it will not last. The "possession" of a 
Fund/Bank approved programme is neither a sufficient or a
2necessary condition for an operational national structural 
adjustment strategy.
6. Macro-economics is not the whole of structural adjustment. 
(Indeed this seminar seeks to cover some key sectoral 
institutional and distributional aspects). However,
macroeconomics is important because macro-economic strategy 
and policies have a major impact on overall resource 
allocation - through prices (including exchange and 
interest rates, wages and - at least for export crops - 
grower prices), institutional structures, taxation and 
public expenditure.
7. The record of countries adopting either national "go it
alone" or internationally backed structural adjustment
programmes is uneven. There have been some spectacular 
failures, a number of long running cases of "bumping along 
the bottom" and a handful of much more promising
performances. Why the marked divergences? Do the 
programmes vary? The contexts? The external and/or 
domestic credibility and staying power of the governments? 
The patterns of negative and positive external shocks? The 
change in levels of net external resource transfers?
8. In the 1988-1989 period a series of themes - "Eradication
of Absolute Poverty", "Basic Needs" - dormant since the 
late 1970's have re-emerged. ECA's Khartoum Conference on 
the Human Dimension (1988) and African Alternatives/
Transformation (1989) study are key examples in and from 
SSA and the Bank's Long Term Perspective Study (1989) from 
the external analytical and advisory community. What is 
the meaning of this shift?
9. What is transformation as distinct from, or following after 
structural adjustment? Is it simply a generalisation of 
short term stabilisation and medium term adjustment to the 
long term building up of institutional and human capacity, 
the creation of an enabling climate for government and
3enterprise sector flexible response to problems, the 
attainment of equitable distribution of growth (enhanced 
production by and employment of poor people - especially 
women - as well as not so poor) and access to public 
services? If it is more than that what are its additional 
key characteristics?
B. From Adjustment to Transformation
1. See Section A.
2. Structural Adjustment has usually been a response to
sustained economic unsuccess including the failure of
attempts to replicate 1974-76 adjustment strategies and to 
regain balance and growth through standard austerity (e.g. 
import compression) measures.
3. Structural Adjustment is designed to facilitate regaining 
balance including:
a. external balance(including resource transfers)
b. general domestic balance (including - as an indicator - 
an end to massive inflation);
c. fiscal balance;
d. savings/investment balance (including external resource 
transfers);
e. food balance.
4. But it is also designed to do so while: a. restoring
positive per capita growth of output; b. averting 
pauperisation of poor and vulnerable groups; c. avoiding 
such drastic compression of personal consumption and basic 
public services as to rend the fabric of society.
A counter factual case that without structural adjustment 
negative trends on these would have been still worse does 
not demonstrate the adequacy of the programme. That
4requires positive outturns as well. Massive absolute 
poverty, inadequate food output especially by poor 
peasants, deficient or inaccessible primary education and 
health care - these are basic failings whose rectification 
is just as much a priority as is raising output growth 
rates which are below those of population and closing 
unsustainable trade and budgetary gaps.
5. Structural adjustment is not revealed truth. On some 
elements reasonable people can disagree particularly in 
specific country contexts. The derivation of actual 
programmes from general principles requires close attention 
to specific structures; imbalances; historic records; 
physical, financial and political potentials and 
constraints. In particular structural adjustment is not a 
patented, off the shelf nostrum (or poison) available from 
the IMF and/or the World Bank. Unless structural 
adjustment has a local factual, analytical, understanding 
and support base it will not succeed.
6. Structural adjustment is concerned with prices, incomes, 
incentives, budgets, external and budgetary balances and 
other monetary aggregates because (and to the extent that) 
these affect levels of real resource production, 
allocation/distribution and growth. Its ultimate concerns 
are real as opposed to narrowly monetary. In that sense it 
is supply side while IMF Stabilisation taken alone operates 
largely on the level of monetary aggregates, is demand 
reduction focussed and is seen as restoring the conditions 
for renewed growth rather than itself providing a growth 
dynamic.
7. Because many SSA economies suffer from extreme imbalance, 
Structural Adjustment will be painful. It will require 
some significant cuts to free resources to provide 
incentives, restore production, rehabilitate existing and 
invest in new fixed capital, restore or create adequate 
policy or non-policy. The choice for most SSA economies is
5to devise and act on viable structural adjustment 
programmes (alone or with the Bank) or to have adjustment 
of one variety or another (including economic collapse) 
imposed on them.
8. Because structural adjustment is widely supported
internationally, adoption of national structural adjustment 
programmes have been the most plausible way to secure the 
additional net transfers of resources to SSA which, for
most economies, are necessary to halt economic decline and
disintegration and create a foundation for renewed
development. Unfortunately net increase in real transfers 
per capita have by no means always followed adoption of
structural adjustment programmes promptly or - in some 
cases - at all. With the changed situation in middle 
(eastern) Europe it is likely that increased levels of 
export credits, commercial loans and direct investment will 
flow there. Even if absolute flows to the South are 
maintained the prospects for increases are limited. Recent 
OECD/DAC estimates are for, at best, a 2% a year real 
growth of net concessional resource transfer, over the 
1990's - that is about a 1% per year per capita fall
measured against SSA population growth.
9. Structural adjustment was originally envisaged as requiring 
up to five years from programme adoption. The time span 
now envisaged seems to be up to seven years after up to 
three years of initial stabilisation. In longer running, 
more successful programmes projections suggest that even 
that time span is unlikely to be adequate to restore 
external balance consistent with continued 4 to 6% growth 
without continued high levels of net soft resource 
transfers and/or massive debt writeoffs.
10. Structural adjustment has been seen as a bridge from crisis 
and initial shoring up (stabilisation) and renewed 
development on moderately changed lines. With some 
structural adjustment efforts (eg Togo, Madagascar) well
6into their second decade questions on how to design the 
transition from adjustment to transformation are becoming 
urgent.
11. What do we mean by transformation? How does it differ from 
continued structural adjustment? How does it diverge from 
development - or at least the commodity export maximisation 
(eg Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia) and the structural 
diversification and modernisation (eg Ghana, Tanzania, 
Kenya) development approaches of the 1955-75 era?
C. The Analytical Framework - Macro and Sectoral Balances and 
Interrelationships
1. What do we mean by balance and/or balances?
2. How can balances and imbalances be set out in national
accounting equations? In monetary magnitudes? In real
(physical) quantities? How can the monetary and real
equation systems be linked/related to each other?
3. Which balances are crucial (and why);
a. external payments
b. food
c. basic consumer goods
d. basic services (health, education, water, agricultural
extension)
e. transport
f. income and goods available (i.e. condition for low 
inflation)
g. government fiscal
h. savings/investment
i. incorrect districution
j . accountability/participation in governance 
k . gender
1. other?
7Are all equally easily handled by national accounting 
equations? What are the interactions among imbalances?
4. How can these imbalances (or some of them) be reduced by:
a. cutting demand (e.g. reducing real public expenditure or 
consumer incomes or imports); and/or
b. raising supply (e.g. increasing intermediate goods, 
imports, increasing real incomes to augment incentives, 
raising taxes)?
5. What are the limits of national accounting equations e.g.
as to data presentation, determination of causation, policy 
result projection? What are the special limits of monetary 
magnitude equations for use in medium terms; real supply 
increase oriented strategies? Of real (constant price) 
formulations in evaluating or projecting external account, 
fiscal and monetary balances?
D. Macro Policy and Structural Transformation
1. What are the costs of rapid, classical stabilisation in a
weak economic structure characterised by rigidity in 
resource use (hard to switch production from one output to 
another)? Do they shift or merely reduce expenditure? 
With weak infrastructure, human investment, institutions 
does stabilisation by cutting resource use lay a foundation
or renewed growth or only for stabilised further 
contraction?
2. How does structural adjustment with growth complement or
conflict with stabilisation? What is the range of results 
of saps? Why is it so wide? Is performance of SSA 
economies with internationally approved saps significantly 
better than for others? Is "others" a useful category ie 
do the policies of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Cape Verde, Sierra 
Leone have enough in common to make them a common group of 
strategies? To the extent economies with internationally
8endorsed saps do perforin better how much of this gain 
relates to increased aid inflows and reduced debt service 
outflows?
3. How can SSA economies reduce their present ratio of imports 
to production and consumption? What does this imply for 
industrialisation? Food and industrial ran material 
agriculture? Consumption patterns? Capital and labour 
intensities in construction?
4. If present unprocessed commodity exports have poor 
prospects and cannot be expected to meet minimum import 
needs (even with import substitution) how should SSA 
transform its export structure?
5. What are SSA's priority human investment needs? How do
these relate to production potential? To income
distribution?
6. How are accountability, transparency of policy and public 
resource use, free selection of leaders, popular 
participation in governance wider than elections alone, 
related to enhanced development? To what extent has their 
weakness contributed to the poor record of the 1980's? If 
governance failure has been important why has decline in 
growth been fairly uniform since 1980 whereas it was not in 
the 1960's or 1975-79?
E. How to Generate and Use Financial Resources for Economic and 
Social Development
1. In what ways can government raise resources?
a. direct taxes (including income, export, royalty)
b. indirect taxes
c. licenses
d. user fees and charges
9e. investment income (eg from Central Bank, other public 
sector enterprises)
f. domestic non-bank borrowing
h. external grants
i. external soft loans
j. external quasi commercial loans (eg World Bank, export 
credits, IMF) 
k. external commercial loans?
2. What are the implications of different sources for:
a. non-government demand?
b. non-government after charge/tax income?
c. income distribution?
d. macro exonomic balance and inflation?
e. external balance?
f. resources for investment available to enterprise and 
household sectors?
g. collection costs (financial, personnel, institutional) 
relative to revenues?
3. How are resources allocated:
a. recurrent
wages and salaries plus related costs 
manitenance
• "working capital" (transport, drugs, textbooks, etc) 
debt service
b. capital
infrastructure - rehabilitation
• infrastructure - extension
investment in public/joint venture enterprises
• lending to private sector enterprises
4. What are the implications of different resource uses for:
a. present total and public service output levels?
b. future output and revenue growth?
c. income and access to public service distribution?
d. import levels?
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5. Are greater efficiency and reduced expenditure synonymous? 
If not, how does efficiency (achieving more output per unit 
of resources used) differ in practice? How can it be 
measured?
6. Are there useable guidelines for maximum and minimum ratios 
of recurrent (tax and charge) revenue to total output? For 
domestic borrowing? How can these be estimated? What 
about similar expenditure (recurrent, capital) spending 
targets? If the revenue maximum target is below the 
expenditure minimum how can reconciliation of these 
contradictory requirements be sought?
F. Part I - Expenditure (and Revenue) Programmes: Recurrent,
Investment, Maintenance
1. How can budgetary and fiscal balance be defined? Is 
"deficit" a good synonym for "financing requirement"? Do 
all financing requirements have comparable short and long 
term impact?
2. Are SSA recurrent and capital expenditures relative to GDP 
excessive? Too low? In what sense? In what sectors (e.g. 
Debt service? Defence? General proportion of expenditure, 
cost/benefit ratio, importance of intended output, 
efficiency of resource use)?
3. What are the macro economic management effects of central 
government budgeting (on the revenue and expenditure side) 
and how can they be used/planned more actively?
4. What are sectoral and distributional effects?
5. What are sub-sectoral and micro effects?
6. In what ways are SSA budgets distributive/redistributive on 
the revenue and on the expenditure sides? Are the sharp
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divergences within the overall impact evidence of 
articulated management, administrative constraints or 
incoherence?
7. In general is revenue (supply) raising or service provision 
(demand) cutting a better general approach to budgetary 
balance restoration? Within what limits? With what 
exceptions (e.g. improved output for resources used type of 
demand cutting)?
8. What are the efficient ways of increasing revenue relative 
to GDP? Which (e.g. export taxes) are likely to have 
serious negative production incentive results? Which (e.g. 
many fees) have very high cost/revenue ratios and pose 
massive administrative problems?
9. Is there a case for basic service fees other than net 
revenue raised? For similar charges on extension services? 
If so, is central or local collection more likely to 
maximise gains and limit negative side effects? Are 
communal contributions (including in kind) likely to be as 
effective, more equitable than centrally posited individual 
user fees? In either case how are genuinely poor people to 
be exempted from fees to avoid major loss of access and 
service coverage?
10. What are the macro economic implications of government 
financing requirements? (Domestic? External?) To what 
extent do these vary with the sources of credit used? To 
what extent is there evidence of "crowding out" - or 
"crowding in" - of enterprise (overall and/or private) 
productive use borrowing by government domestic credit 
raising?
11. When should balance restoration focus on expenditure 
cutting and when on revenue raising? How much in terms of 
cost savings can be expected from programme redesign? Or 
is the most effective use of such redistribution (e.g.
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raising preventative and primary health service spending 
relative to hospital services) primarily in terms of 
allowing restoration of service coverage at lower
incremental costs?
12. If real government wages and salaries are too low to 
motivate personnel, allow them to work full time and to 
prevent attrition of the most competent ones, what 
practical steps are open to financially constrained 
governments? What action is appropriate if staffing levels 
are above numbers who can be supplied with adequate fixed 
(e.g. vehicles, medical equipment) and working (e.g. 
petrol, spares, drugs) capital? How common are significant 
levels of "ghost workers" (i.e. real payroll entries not 
representing real people)? How can they be exorcised?
13. Are capital budgets usually too high or too low relative to 
recurrent? Why? Are capital and recurrent budget 
interactions adequately coordinated? Why not? In what 
areas is non-coordination most evident? Are PPI's 
(Priority Programmes of Investment) suitable overall SAP 
(Structural Adjustment Programme) designing of funding 
foci?
Part II - Investment and Maintenance
1. How does one relate public investment programming to 
overall - government, public enterprise, private 
enterprise, household - investment planning? How does one 
avoid over-ambitious targets at both planning and 
programming level? In what ways do such targets raise 
costs, lower efficiency, reduce output and effective 
investment? How can a PPI avoid being bogged down in an 
excessive number of underfunded, behind schedule projects?
2. What micro, sectoral and macro criteria (beyond project 
level cost/benefit at probable market prices) are 
theoretically, analytically, administratively usable/
13
useful? What are their actual strengths and limitations? 
Is the bottom line problem usually primarily 
unsophisticated analysis or inadequate (incomplete, 
inaccurate, imaginary) data?
3. Why are so many projects not subjected to any serious
evaluation - including especially of operating period 
output, scarce resource requirements and cash flow results?
4. How can the risk of/sensibility to radically altered macro
economic contexts be taken into account in project 
evaluation? (e.g. if import capacity allowed fuller 
capacity utilisation - as expected over 1976-80 - overall 
ICOR's for 1975-85 in much of SSA would look much 
healthier. Would conventional sensitivity analysis have 
been usable to limit the losses resulting from actual as 
opposed to project import capacity? How?)
5. Why is maintenance a preferred category for government (and
less uniformly public enterprise) expenditure cuts ahead
both of other recurrent items and also of new fixed
investment? What is the logic of creating more capacity 
when budgetary or import constraints prevent reasonable
maintenance and capacity utilisation levels for existing 
assets? How could shifts from new projects to maintenance 
and rehabilitation increase GDP? Economic efficiency? 
Ease fiscal and external balance constraints? At what
medium and long term costs?
6. How can capacity utilisation, maintenance/rehabilitation,
bottleneck breaking, general new capacity creation trade­
offs be taken into account more explicitly at enterprise, 
ministry, sectoral and macro levels?
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G. Institutional Issues: Public Policy and Performance
1. What is public policy? How does it relate to "governance" 
more generally?
2. How can/should/are public policy decisions (choices) made? 
By whom? On the basis of what information and dialogues or 
debates? How can/should/are those taking decisions held 
accountable? For what (honesty? reasonable judgement? 
results?)? To whom (external agencies? civil society? 
political leaders? pressure groups/elites? broadly based 
organisations? social groups eg peasants - family sector 
agricultural households, unionised workers, women, armed 
forces?)
3. How are accounting - reporting - transparancy of budgets, 
economic surveys, programme and project reports related to 
accountability in the broader sense?
4. Can the capacity (personnel, institutional structure, 
financial resources), efficiency (use of resources for 
intended purposes with some positive results), probity 
(avoidance or corruption/limitation of conflict of 
interest) and political accountability ("democratic") 
aspects of public policy, and its results be separated 
analytically? Operationally? To what extent do they 
interact?
5. How can the governmental process be institutionalised to 
improve public policy in respect of:
a. data used?
b. decisions taken?
c. efficiency of resource use?
d. prompt/relevant efforts to act on decisions?
e. evaluation of outcomes (lending to revisions)?
f. accountability?
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6. Is the current equation of multi party democracy and 
development a serious analytical breakthrough or a passing 
'development community' fashion? What are its implications 
for SSA? If it is an analytical approach, why is the old 
semi-authoritarian, nationalist, national interest, 
interventionist model (eg Bismarck's Germany, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya according to proponents) so 
little mentioned? How does one avoid repeating 1960's and 
1970's history of multi party, democratic constitutional 
orders rapidly collapsing and often doing so repeatedly 
when serious efforts were made to restore them (eg Ghana 
late 1960's, late 1970's; Migeria late 1970's)?
H. Institutional Issues:_____ Public Service and Public Policy
Implementation
I. Public Service Roles and Repsonsibilities
1. How can one define the public service? What are its 
responsibilities in respect to public policy?
2. Why do public policy decisions fail to be acted on by the 
public service:
a. decisions not possible to carry out?
b. public service personnel and institutional capacity too 
low? (If so why - more and more trained/experienced 
staff than in 1960's or 1970's in a majority of 
countries -)
c. public service low morale (material rewards? non­
material terms and conditions of service? other?)?
d. public service misinterpretation or confusion as to what 
decisions call upon them to do?
e. public service objections (own interests? public 
interest? other?) to acting as instructed?
3. What can be done about problems/problematics identified at 
"2" above?
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II Management of Civil Service Reform
1. What are the basic goals of civil service reform:
a. institutional
b. personnel competence
c . programme capacity enhancement
d. priority alteration
e. personnel motivation enhancement
f. cost reduction
g. other?
2. What are the major barriers to achieving them:
a. knowledge
b. practicability of proposals
c. vested interests - civil servants
d. vested interests - other
e. social consequences
f. financial cost
g. personnel availability and motivation
h. other?
3. What is meant by overstaffing:
a. relative to work to be done
b. to available fixed and working capital
c. to financial resources
d. other?
4. Why in proposals for reduction of staff is so much emphasis
placed on "redeployment" (meaning sacking) and so little on 
using genuine redeployment plus non or partial replacement 
of normal turnover (usually 3 to 5% a year) to achieve 
significant reductions over 3 to 5 years?
5. Are attempts to turn the majority of "redeployed" civil
servants into independent entrepreneurs realistic? If not
(or, indeed, if so) what training or experience over what
period would best serve their needs? What do they think?
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6. Why do most civil service reforms suffer from standard 
problems of increasing complexity, setting too short a time 
span for implementation (followed by open ended date 
slippage), making palpably impracticable proposals or 
procedures, increasing personnel required to do a given 
amount of work? Would greater use of local and 
particularly experienced public administrator inputs assist 
in avoiding these snags? How and why?
7. How can civil service reform planning be coordinated with 
other aspects of policy change? (e.g. user fees tend to 
increase the number of collections to be made several fold, 
to be bookeeper intensive and to have high collection 
cost/gross receipts ratios - all features most revenue and 
treasury administration reforms seek to reduce).
I. Public and Private Enterprises: Role, Reform, Management,
Pr ivat isat ion
1. What is a public enterprise? What are appropriate public 
enterprise goals? How - and when - should these diverge 
from those of private enterprises?
2. What form of relationship is appropriate between the 
shareholder (state) and the enterprise? To what extent 
should overall shareholder goals determine its directions 
to the enterprise? Is the TNC-subsidiary relationship 
relevant to this question?
3. Why do most public enterprises in SSA not have clear 
budgets (recurrent or profit and loss, capital - or 
investment - and cash flow) even when governments want 
them to do so? Why are other - including real output - 
targets even less frequently specified (or checked against 
results after the event)? Is the basic problem overcontrol
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or anarchic, unaccountable autonomy? Or both? Does direct 
foreign intervention lessen or increase these problems?
4. Why is public enterprise performance so uneven in SSA -
among countries, among sectors, within sectors? What are 
the basic obstacles to improving average performance?
5. When can privatisation (including joint ventureisation) 
yield significant gains? Is it likely - given the 
capacities of private sectors and the poor average rate of 
return on assets in SSA - to be a general solution to any 
substantial portion of overall enterprise sector problems? 
If it means sale to foreign owners what economic and
political issues does this raise? Is it better to sell an 
enterprise before rehabilitation; to turn it into a joint 
venture with a post rehabilitation full purchase option to 
the partner; to rehabilitate before sale? When and why?
6. Why are subsidies and other resource transfers to most
public enterprises handled ad hoc and ex post? Are the 
negative effects of this failure to budget and pay pre-set 
transfers and to achieve a clear capital structure
significant?
7. Are public enterprises in SSA too rigidly state controlled?
Too anarchically autonomous with no effective 
accountability to their government owners? Or both? Can 
user or client (e.g consumer, peasant farmer)
accountability be built into their structures and
processes? Should it? Why? How? Does direct 
accountability to external agencies help or hinder? In 
what ways and for what purposes?
8. Are joint ventures with minority external (or domestic)
equity/management partners generally more efficient than 
pure public enterprises? Why? Can they in practice be 
held accountable? Why or why not? When and how?
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9. What are the basic, remediable weaknesses which recur 
frequently in SSA public enterprise management?
10. What are the potentialities and limitations of indigenous 
small, medium and private enterprises? Are the answers 
different if they are minority community owned?
11. What roles can foreign enterprises play? Do these 
necessarily imply wholly or majority owned subsidiaries?
12. What relationships should government develop with small, 
medium and large scale private enterprises? What 
information and capabilities does it need to do so? Why do 
so few governments identify or acquire these capabilities?
J. Exchange Rate Policies
1. What has been the evolution of the SSA external balance 
position since 1970?
a. What management tools have been used? (e.g. exchange 
rate, import compression, export subsidy)?
b. How well did they work over 1973-76? Over 1979-85? 
Since 1985? Why the differences?
c. How has exchange rate policy affected external balance 
and growth?
2. What is meant when SSA economies are referred to as 
suffering from "import strangulation"? Does this imply a 
need for more exports, more import substitute production or 
both? On the basis of what criteria? What are the uses 
and limits of altering foreign exchange prices?
3. What considerations are relevant to management of the price 
of foreign exchange (exchange rate)? What are the costs of 
a significantly overvalued rate? What approaches - size, 
speed, determination of change, predictability - are likely
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to avoid severe under or overvaluation arising and/or 
facilitate return to a roughly plausible price?
4. What interactions (positive and negative) exist between the
foreign exchange price, other price instruments (e.g. 
tariffs, subsidies) and analytical (e.g. prioritised import 
capacity allocation) or administrative (e.g. routine 
exchange control) instruments for external balance 
management?
5. How can a transition from:
a. extreme overvaluation, import strangulation, export 
stagnation, de facto default and massive trade arrears, 
negative growth and low capacity utilisation toward
b. an external balance position which is sustainable (and 
manageable) consistent with real per capita growth be 
initiated and continued?
c. In particular what exchange rate adjustment approaches 
(e.g. large discretionary devaluations, managed floats, 
auctions) are likely to be most effective when and why?
6. What are the potential gains, risks and costs of attempted
once for all ("short sharp shock") and phased ("sequential, 
incremental") approaches to adjustment in general and 
devaluation in particular.
7. What is meant by overvaluation?
a. appreciation on the basis of nominal exchange rates vis- 
a-vis SDR, or major trading partners and/or competitors 
adjusted for relative changes in cost of living or unit 
labour costs? How can a non-overvalued base period be 
chosen?
b. relative costs of a basket of goods? Domestic or 
export?
c. if non-overvaluation as defined at "a" or "b" still 
results, as it does in a substantial number of SSA 
economies, in a large current account deficit (excluding 
official grants) what then? Will further devaluation
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improve the current account balance? When, why, over 
what time span and at what costs?
d. do negative terms of trade shifts result in 
overvaluation? In what sense? Is devaluation (raising 
the relative domestic prices of goods whose relative 
world prices are falling) an appropriate remedy in this 
case? Or does it represent perverse intervention in the 
market which hinders reform of production structures? 
If so what alternative courses of action can limit or 
finance resulting current account deficits? For how 
long and at what costs?
8. What is meant by a "sustainable exchange rate"? In the
context of structural adjustment or transformation how - if 
at all - can such a rate be estimated without positing or 
projecting levels of net external resource transfers?
K. The Special Programme for Africa
1. What is the SPA? What role does the World Bank play in it?
Other UN Family agencies? Bilaterals?
2. How does SPA relate to APPER (Africa's Priority Programme
for Economic Recovery) and UNPAERD (United Nations 
Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development)?
3. What results has SPA attained:
a. toward increasing understanding of SSA contexts and 
problematics?
b. in augumenting total soft resource flows to SSA?
c. in responding to SSA priorities through genuine dialogue 
toward "donor fuelled" not "donor driven" programmes?
d. through coordinating source and user institutions to 
strengthen national strategic formulation, financial 
allocation and control?
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4. What are SPA's prospects following 1990 Paris review and
recommitment meeting?
L. SSA: Some Debt and Aid Issues
1. What is the total of SSA external debt? Debt service?
What difficulties exist in arriving at even approximately
accurate answers? What is the position in relation to your 
country?
2. Why did SSA external debt rise so rapidly in the 1970's and 
early 1980's? Was this borrowing arguably prudent at the 
time? In retrospect?
3. Are typical SSA external debt/GDP and debt service/exports 
ratios high or low compared to other Third World regions? 
If they are high, why has this not been perceived until 
quite recently?
4. Is debt/debt service relief a desirable way of halting the 
decline in net real resource transfers to SSA? What 
alternative measures could produce the same result?
5. Why are Peru type unilateral debt service limitations less 
likely to serve most SSA economies' interests than they 
would those of several Latin American and Asian economies? 
Are Brady type commercial debt reduction schemes 
potentially relevant? For which economies?
6. What are the basic parameters of the Paris Club (government 
creditors - including government guaranteed export credit) 
debt reschedulings? Have they altered since 1984? If so 
how? What are the positive implications and limitations of 
the Toronto Summit statement and Baker/Brady Plan 
approaches?
What goals should an SSA government seeking external debt 
negotiation set? How should it negotiate? When? When is 
negotiation inappropriate or ill timed?
How practical is it for how many SSA economies to seek to 
reallocate foreign exchange now to reduce external debt 
(and debt service) significantly by the early 1990's?
What has been the recent trend in external resource flows
to SSA? In nominal, real or real per capita terms? For
structurally adjusting and for other economies?
Is there a resource gap? How can it be estimated? For
what types of resources in particular? Are the Wass Report 
estimates of $5,000 million a year realistic? Are the 
ratio higher ones of the LTPS more likely to be correct? 
How can they be filled if ODA (aid) growth in the 1990's is 
- as expected - low?
What impact does under financing have on stabilisation/ 
adjustment programmes:
a. speed of change required?
b. degree of initial demand cutback needed?
c. adequacy of structural change related fixed investment?
d. human investment and social costs? Speed of attainment 
of offsetting benefits?
e. political and social implications of interaction of 
previous answers?
Are non-concessional resource flows likely to be usable in 
SSA:
a. For what purposes?
b. in which countries?
c. what kinds of flows of direct equity investment, IMF 
drawings. World Bank "bank window" loans, Northern 
government guaranteed export credits are safely usable 
and likely to be available? Are investment codes.
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investor protection and tax concessions central or 
peripheral to the answer?
13. How can the separate accounting formats required by
donors/lenders be made less incompatible with achieving 
national accounting/reporting systems which are timely,
transparent, accountable? Is the problem one of principle
or of the extra data preparation/presentation load placed 
on limited public sector accounting - reporting - auditing 
institutional capacity and personnel?
14. Can both new external resource inflows and debt service
outflows (including rescheduling) be operated on a rolling
3 to 5 year projection basis? Would this facilitate medium 
term strategic budgeting, resource allocation, planning? 
What are the obstacles to achieving it?
M. Agriculture Price and Non-Price Issues
1. How responsive to price and non-price incentives is total
output from the agricultural sector? Do price and non­
price incentives influence mainly the composition of 
agricultural output and not the aggregate supply? How much 
do we know about actual food prices to growers even 
(especially?) when official prices and supposedly single 
channel marketing exist?
2. What is the SSA production record? Since 1965? Since
1980? Since 1985? Why - especially in the 1970's - have 
there been both relative shifts from export and industrial 
to domestic food crop production and growing food 
shortages? What does this imply as to the limitations of 
price incentives? The reality or otherwise of supply 
expansion constraints?
3. What do we know (or think we know) about relative and
absolute (real purchasing power) grower price trends for
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exports, industrial and domestic food crops? Why are there 
combinations of "dear food" (consumer prices rising faster 
than wages and often than COL) and falling farmer real 
incomes eg Nigeria 1970's and 1980's? And the apparant 
reverse - "cheap food" (sharp falls in nominal food 
price/COL ratios) and sustained food production growth 
(e.g. Ghana 1984-1989)?
4. What do we know (or believe) about nominal and real price 
supply elasticities - both cross elasticities among crops 
and overall output elasticities? Do these vary for peasant 
farmers, larger individual producers, corporate farmers?
5. How do official prices, single channel marketing and
overvalued exchange rates affect grower prices:
a. for different types of crop?
b. for different types of producer?
Do they significantly affect domestic food retail and 
grower prices and marketing channels? When and why?
6. What are the roles of agriculture in SSA economies and
structural adjustment:
a. rural household income (including production for own 
use)
b. urban household income (cash or own use) supplement
c . food supplies
d. 'urban' goods markets
e. inputs for industry
f . foreign exchange
g. tax revenue?
How do these complement, conflict with each other?
7. Why have large scale, capital intensive approaches to
agricultural production (usually with special forex, input 
price or purchase price concession or incentives) received 
priority attention in SSA agriculture? How well do they 
fulfill the roles noted under question five? When are they
26
appropriate? What has been their overall performance 
record?
8. Do large scale schemes, via input and capital cost 
recovery, depress the net grower prices for tenants? If so 
what incentive effects do they have? Why?
9. What are workable:
a. grower price
b. marketing structure (and cost)
c. user price
d. food security
e. export revenue
f. land tenure/land reform goal patterns in SSA economies 
and how can price and other market management tools 
contribute to achieving them?
10. What physical constraints limit effective agricultural 
production in SSA:
a. access to/cost of transport
b. access to buyers
c. timely availability
d. access to basic health and water services and to 
household fuel
e. storage losses
f. access to land
g. access to complementary inputs (labour, tools, working 
capital, etc
h. war or civil disorder?
i. weather 
j. other?
11. What incentives other than price have limited production:
a. ready access to buyers
b. prompt, effective (cash or cashable cheque) payment
c. access to basic services
d. availability of basic consumer and construction (i.e 
"incentive") goods at places accessible to farmers
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e. high unit production costs
f. other?
12. What knowledge barriers limit output increases:
a. basic research data
b. local technical testing and adaption of data
c. testing for grower economic viability and 'user 
friendliness' of proposed techniques
d. extension service ability to extend (either because of 
lack of knowledge or of extension personnel and 
transport)
e. faulty teaching approaches by extension personnel
f. lack of basic and relevant continuing education 
available to farmers (and especially to the majority who 
are women)
g. failure to integrate knowledge creation, testing, 
adaption, extension (and consequential physical 
requirements) into overall agricultural strategy
h. basic lack of agricultural data (e.g. total and per 
hectare yields, marketed output, marketing flow 
patterns)
i. other?
13. Is 'traditional' land tenure a barrier to investment? To 
higher productivity? Why? When? How general and rapid is 
transformation of indigenous tenure systems? In what 
directions? Why are state initiated "freehold tenure" and 
"title registration" systems usually ineffective? How 
could land law and the civil society led transformations of 
indigenous tenure systems be made more complementary?
14. What can be done to relax the constraints set out at Paras 
12-13? What resources would be required over what time 
sequence? Why do approaches to these issues feature much 
less prominently in most structural adjustment policy 
formulation than price (nominally real but in practice 
largely nominal) increases? Is this imbalance a relative
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misallocation of resources when price differentials appear 
to explain only a tenth of differentials in output trends?
15. Given the high (relative to wages) and rising (relative to 
cost of living) food prices at consumer level in most SSA 
economies - especially over 1979/1985 - can approaches to 
issues posed in 1, 2 and 3 provide higher real farmer 
household incomes while avoiding yet steeper real user food 
price hikes? How?
16. Should extension services be expanded? Improved in 
quality? Cut back to the levels present knowledge, 
supporting inputs (e.g. vehicles, fuel), user takeup and 
output results would justify (which might mean 75% cuts in 
some cases)?
17. Should agriculture and related research spending be raised 
first or existing finance and personnel redeployed to raise 
productivity (how defined?) before expansion? Is the 5 to 
20 year lag between initial research design and resource 
use and substantial production pay-offs a justification for 
high or low emphasis on research in structural adjustment 
programmes?
N. Targettinq Research for Agricultural Development
1. What should be the relationship between/among agricultural 
strategy, programmes, targets, extension services and 
agricultural research? What are the actual relationships 
in SSA?
2. How can one reduce the lead time from conceptualising 
research through attaining results, field testing and 
extension to farmer use and (hopefully) output gains?
3. Why is it often argued both that SSA is too dependent on 
European (former colonial metropoli) research design and
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personnel and makes too little use of the network of 
international agricultural research institutes? What is 
the contribution of the present international institutes in 
Ibadan (root crops) and Nairobi (insect pathology)? What 
potential have sub-regional research coordination, data 
exchange, joint projects (as emphasised by SADCC)?
4. How can the social science aspects of research results when 
put into practice be taken into account better in research 
design and field testing?
5. Are the main problems in SSA research lack of professional 
staff and financial resources? Abs lutely or relative to 
agricultural production? (Recent data suggest that 
relative to agricultural output, resources devoted to 
research and - especially - extension in several SSA 
economies are comparable to Asian levels). Or is it 
efficiency ie useable/tested results achieved per unit of 
resources devoted? Or communication ie failure to 
communicate results effectively to an extension service 
and/or from it to farmers?
0. Industry's Role In Structural Adjustment, 'Policy and Capability 
Building Issues'
1. What roles can present underutilised capacity play in:
a. choking off inflation
b. increasing supplies of incentive goods to farmers
c. reducing net import requirements
d. providing inputs into other industries and sectors
e. generating domestic incomes (of employees, suppliers, 
etc. )
f. increasing government revenue (e.g. via sales tax)
g. increasing investible surplus
h. providing more dynamic markets for farmers and artisans?
i. other?
What are the key requirements for doing so:
a. operating inputs
b. spares
c. rehabilitation
d. altering production (and/or input) mix
e. more high and or middle level personnel (in what skill 
areas)
f. more dependable supplies of power, water, fuel, etc.
g. greater availability of domestic maintenance, spares and 
simple capital goods
h. augmenting and diversifying exports
i. other?
What are the principal barriers to progress on meeting 
these requirements? Why do both public and private sector 
enterprise managements appear slow to respond to new 
problems and possibilities? Are enterprise managerial 
structures weaker than in 1960's and late 1970's? Or are 
they overwhelmed by much higher demands? In either case, 
how can they be strengthened?
To what extent will increased production be self-financing 
at present real prices (i.e. lower unit overhead costs and 
present unit prices on a greater volume restoring or 
augmenting cash flow viability)? What other price or price 
related policy steps are needed:
a. modification (e.g. to annual efficient cost plus), 
reduction (e.g. to 15-25 basic commodities) or dropping 
of price controls
b. reduction in real input costs - Which? How?
c. greater and more flexible access to foreign exchange
d. other?
To the extent that full or normal late 1970s (say 70% of 
nominal capacity) utilisation rate restoration cannot be 
achieved in the short run, what allocation priorities 
should be used for scarce capital or imported input flows:
a. ex factory value/foreign exchange requirement ratio?
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b. relevance to reducing key input and/or incentive goods 
shortages?
c. short or medium term financial viability?
d. short or medium term export potential?
e. positive linkages (external benefits) to other
manufacturing sub-sectors and other sectors?
f. other?
Or are direct allocation (the commonest SSA model) and 
managed market direction (the South Korean model)
inappropriate and market/short term ability to pay the best 
allocational model?
6. What data are required for rational short, medium and/or 
long term industrial strategy, policy, resource allocation 
decisions? How (to what extent) can it be acquired?
7. How can industry be used to reduce the national import/GDP 
ratios (especially in respect to fixed investment)?
8. Can industry increase the export/GDP ratios by:
a. processing/manufacturing present raw exports?
b. facilitating additional export oriented natural resource 
exploitation?
c. increasing intra regional (or broader South-South) 
trade?
9. Are these two goals (import substitution/export promotion)
best seen as alternatives or complements? What role can a
protected home market play in promoting (or deterring)
exports?
10. What price, forex allocation, credit, tax, infrastructure
provision and other incentives are needed to encourage 
capacity utilisation/rehabilitation/capacity creation along 
lines needed for 7 and 8? How can probable results (and 
costs) of such incentives be projected and monitored? Why
are many which are at least nominally available not taken
up?
32
11. In view of input and incentive goods considerations should 
selective restoration of manufactured goods output lead, go 
parallel to or lag targeted increases in agricultural 
production?
12. How can realistic manufacturing sector lags and output 
recovery targets be built into structural adjustment 
strategies and annual goals? Why has output recovery in 
most programmes been slow (relative to at least nominal 
unused capacity) and below projections?
13. In a situation of multiple and complex market and non-
market constraints of present unit costs provide a good 
guide to underlying static or dynamic comparative 
advantage? Can plausible estimates of unit costs of 
rehabilitated recapitalised operations at plausible 
capacity utilisation be made: How?
14. How can initial sectoral and product protection be used to 
build up a capacity base, cost structure and market 
perspective compatible to moving into exports (as Brazil 
and South Korea have done and Zimbabwe has begun to do)? 
What policies to complement (or limit) protection are 
consistent with achieving such a transition?
15. Do structural adjustment programmes place a 
disproportionate burden on the informal sector and small 
scale industries? Can measures be identified which will 
minimise the costs of adjustment for small scale industries 
and encourage their growth?
p. Restructuring Regional and International Relations
1. What exports can be encouraged, how, by what measures with
what results, e.g.:
a. traditional primary products (price elasticity issue);
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b. processed forms of present exports (market access 
issues);
c. natural resource based products (viability/ 
identification, finance issues);
d. selected manufacturers (identification, promotion 
issues)
e. why has so little specific work been done on analysing 
potentials?
2. What are the terms of trade trends and prospects for:
a. hard minerals?
b. hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon products?
c. beverages?
d. other tropical agricultural and silvicultural products?
e. potential manufactured exports?
3. In the case of SSA's major raw material exports will SSA's 
stepping up output growth increase or decrease total export 
earnings? Does this apply at country level? If the two 
answers differ how can the inherent contradiction be 
solved?
4. The UNCTAD sponsored Fraser Report advocates greater 
priority to exports and their promotion and makes five 
major points:
a. diversification of exports;
b. greater participation in pre-export processing and 
manufacturing as well as in post-export trading;
c. import substitution - especially in food:
d. aggressive promotion of higher export volume and valve;
e. including from present major export commodities.
How practicable is this agenda? Are d and e consistent for 
- eg cacoa - with a price elasticity of .1 to .25 and an 
SSA share of exports of over .5 (indeed Cote d'Ivoire and 
Ghana nationally are over .1)?
5. If transformation of export structures (efficient export 
promotion) and of import proportion reduction (efficient
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import substitution) are crucial what immediate action to
create an enabling climate of knowledge and incentives is '
needed? Why is so little systematic attention paid to
country by country viable export diversification prospects?
6. What roles can economic regionalism/sub-regionalism play 
in:
a. broadening export diversification potential?
b. stengthening manufacturing sectors in respect to import 
substitution and global exportation by providing broader 
markets (economics of scale) and initial export business 
learning/experience (capacity building)?
c. reducing regional dependence (as a proportion of output) 
on extra-regional imports?
7. What instruments/actions are needed for establishing viable 
regional/sub-regional economic transformations beyond trade 
preferences (lower tariffs among partners than against 
outsiders) and standard short term clearing payments 
arrangements:
a. enhanced knowledge of markets/sources backed by better 
communications infrastructure?
b. improved transport infrastructure?
c. export orientation by enterprises beyond traditional 
commodity producers?
d. mechanisms to encourage partners to import as well as 
export because i) the purpose of exports is to pay for 
imports and ii) large and growing bilateral trade 
imbalances within a region often tend to render its 
continued advance politically impracticable and 
economically polarising?
e. encouragement of trade in services (eg finance, 
commerce) and special "visibles" (eg electricity, 
construction) especially where this would increase the 
regional exports of structural deficit countries?
f. coordinated strategic planning of infrastructure, 
communications and production to create an enabling set 
of availabilities for export, requirements for import
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and ability for enterprises to communicate needs, make 
transactions, get the goods from point of production to 
that of use promptly and cheaply?
Q.-R.-S. Poverty, Vulnerability, Employment and Basic Services
• Production by Poor People
• Informal Sector Industrialisation
• Human Development Report
Part One - Employment/Self Employment
1. What is a workable definition of employment (including self 
employment) in SSA?
2. How is employment (in proportions) divided among formal 
wage and salary, informal wage and salary, non-agricultural 
self employed, agricultural self employed? What proportion 
of households derive a substantial share of income from 
more than one of these sectors?
3. How can unemployment, under-employment and pseudo 
(extremely low productivity) employment be defined 
operationally?
4. To what extent (and under which conditions) are 'high' 
returns to labour a serious limitation on employment? In 
which is the basic problem low (average and/or marginal) 
productivity? To what extent do approaches to solving 
these two problems differ? Converge?
5. In what senses and in which (sub) sectors are African wages 
'high'? To what extent are typical non-agricultural 
household incomes (measured in consuming power terms) 
higher than typical (say middle 50-70%) peasant household 
incomes? What has been their real and relative evolution 
since 1970? Since 1980? Is the image of an urban wage
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elite with real consuming power far above that of the 
typical peasant household still valid or largely obsolete? 
If the latter do urban real income falls or peasant income 
changes account for narrowed (or reversed) differentials?
6. Are wages and salaries in SSA too low for productive 
efficiency (i.e so low that major disincentive effects and 
'parallel' or 'multiple' marketing of labour time result)? 
Does this imply a need for higher real wages? If so, does 
it also imply a need to aim at a much smaller, less ill- 
paid formal (and especially government) sector labour 
force? In that case how are the persons retrenched to 
escape a rapid descent into absolute poverty?
7. What are the limits to the small scale agricultural 
"sponge" effect? That is, what is one to make of estimates 
(FAO) that in half of SSA rural population is above stable 
land carrying capacity at plausible technology and input 
projections or that 500,000 rural residents of Kenya are 
estimated to be scratching out livings on sub-marginal 
land? To what extent can the productivity frontier on 
relatively low potential land be raised? Or should one 
concentrate on output increases on high potential land and 
abandon the households in low potential areas to their fate 
on macro-economic triage principles?
8. Does the rapid apparent growth of informal urban sector 
employment and self-employment represent a healthy growth 
pattern? To what extent and in which sub-sectors - e.g in 
commerce does it re-divide existing rather than augmenting 
total sectoral income? What is the potential for increased 
reasonably productive employment/self employment in this 
sector? What state action (or deliberate avoidance of 
particular actions) would facilitate such growth?
9. Can the stagnation or decline in private sector formal 
employment in most of the SSA be halted and reversed? Is 
this primarily a cause or a consequence of more general
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economic unsuccess? Why do many private entrepreneurs with 
profits, cash balances, access to credit, apparently 
promising home and export markets choose not to invest? Or 
in at least one case to invest primarily in government 
stock?
10. To what extent do training and education programmes relate 
to employment opportunities/needs? Why are open and de 
facto unemployment at all levels below university graduate 
(and sometimes at that level) combined with real shortages 
of qualified personnel at middle and high levels? What 
additional training is needed? In what ways can the state 
provide or facilitate its provision?
11. What research, extension, training and supporting services 
would facilitate expansion of, and raising productivity, in 
the informal sector? Why is there little in the way of 
effective policy or programming in these fields?
Part Two - Poor People and Vulnerable Groups
1. Why are standard structural adjustment programmes perceived 
as placing disproportionate burdens on poor people, 
vulnerable groups? To what extent is this a valid 
perception? Does the introduction of SDA (Social 
Dimensions of Adjustment) into the Bank's standard sectoral 
mission menu alter this? Why or why not?
2. To what extent can particular burdens on poor, dangers to 
vulnerable groups be identified in structural adjustment 
programme design? Can programmes to minimise, offset, 
insure against key elements in these costs/risks be 
identified? Costed? Financed?
3. Why are government expenditure cuts - whether in structural 
adjustment or other contexts - regularly biased against 
poor people and remote areas? What can be done to reverse 
that bias?
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4. Is it reasonable to view basic health, education, water,
extension services as amenity consumer goods? What is 
their relation to present ability to produce? To future 
potential for productivity gains? To incentives? To 
social and political stability? Why does LTPS like AA 
sharply alter the priority given to these sectors?
5. Is more production by poor people economically practicable
(especially in terms of scarce resources)? Cost efficient? 
Likely to reduce import intensity of production and 
consumption? If so, why is it rarely specifically 
identified as a goal and why are articulated 
policies/programmes for achieving it still more rarely 
designed and implemented?
6. If basic services are critical to production and production
by poor people is frequently cost efficient (especially in 
foreign exchange terms) why are these points (and 
employment/productive self employment generation) so rarely 
treated as integral to structural adjustment strategy as 
opposed to being seen initially as inconsistent with and 
now as secondary elements tacked on to it?
7. If highly unequal income distribution, inadequate basic
services and pauperisation of substantial groups of people 
characterise an economy is it an adequate defense of a 
particular structural adjustment programme to say that 
without it they would have been even worse? Or should 
targets in respect to these challenges (socio economic 
inefficiencies) be built into structural adjustment 
programmes? What are the social and political consequences 
of brushing aside "human condition" and "fabric of society" 
issues? If these lead to disorder and/or programme 
collapse what are the direct economic costs? How can one 
broaden accountability and participation in contexts of 
slow growth and high absolute poverty proportion consistent
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with achieving practicable policies and resource use 
targets?
Part Three - Informal Sector Industrialisation
1. What do we mean by "informal sector"? In particular how 
can the "industrial informal sector" be defined?
2. What range of household (family sector or micro), artisanal 
(mini) and workshop/small factory (small/medium) scale 
enterprises are involved? How important are they in 
producing goods? Achieving increases in sectoral value 
added? Providing adequate livelihoods for significant 
numbers of people? Do different types of enterprise or 
divisions by product or activity have radically different 
present and potential levels of contribution?
3. Beyond avoiding or removing discrimination against, and 
bureaucratic over administration in respect to, informal 
sector enterprises (including well intentioned support 
measures which end as "smother love"), what state 
interventions, if any, are appropriate? What are the 
minimum appropriate health, safety, employment, product 
quality standards, regulations needed and practicable?
4. Should present de facto exemption (by policy and/or 
avoidance) of such enterprises from direct and indirect 
taxation be continued? What are its costs/benefits to 
informal sector, formal sector, state, economy? (eg if 
"invisibility" allows avoiding collecting 15% sales tax and 
paying 5% to 10% of gross sales license and related fees 
plus 40% to 50% profits tax, then arguably informal sector 
enterprises are net recipients of favourable discrimination 
- genuinely benign neglect?).
5. What are common problems for informal sector industrial 
enterprises:
a. lack of access to modern sector (bank) credit?
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b. high cost of (or lack of access to) indigenous credit 
sources (eg tontines, savings and credit societies, 
moneylenders)?
c. limited availability of raw materials and spare parts 
(especially when imported)?
d. inadequate managerial and bookeeping/accounting skills - 
especially for expansion?
e. weakness in skills training of available employees and 
lack of relevant vocational training courses?
f. market limitations - especially lack of access to 
wholesale/retail outlets if production is expanded?
6. What actions by whom would help overcome these problems?
Part Four - Human Environment and Ecology
1. How does need force poor households to damage the ecology? 
eg over-cultivation, deforestation. Why do they commit 
this damage even though they know it will increase their 
and their children's future problems?
2. What ways of tackling the ecological damage caused by need 
are practicable and humane? eg in relation to trees, 
wildlife, erosion.
3. Is the growth of population and especially of numbers of
absolutely poor households, a serious ecological threat? A 
barrier to enhancing per household output of poor people 
and access to basic services?
4. Is the basic causation population growth to poverty or
poverty to population growth? Or are both important?
5. What is meant by "having a population policy"?
6. Do the following constitute a practicable set of areas for
policy and programme interventions toward a population 
strategy:
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a. reducing infant mortality
b. increasing female education
c. reducing levels of moderate/severe malnutrition 
(especially among children)
d. broadening safety nets for aged and disabled to reduce 
'need' for children as personal social security schemes.
e. presentation of case for "family spcaing" in terms of 
improved child and mother health
f. presentation of case for reasoned (chosen) family size 
taking inot account household's probable resources and 
welfare of children (with special attention to male 
audiences)
g. provision of effective access to family planning 
services (including birth control technology) on the 
same basis as pre-natal, post-natal, well child growth 
monitoring and vaccination programmes?
7. What measures/goals beyond those at 6 above are desireable,
practicable - at present? over the course of the 1990's?
T. Gender and Development
1. What are gender issues/relationships in relation to 
development? At household, community, sectoral and 
national levels? Why and how are they important?
2. Is there now a general awareness that in SSA women 
participate fully in production as well as doing almost all 
watering, fuelling, tending of sick household members, care 
of children, washing and cleansing, cooking and household 
maintenance? Are the implications of the resultant 12-16 
hour typical working day recognised e.g. negative health 
impact? limited ability to produce more unless major time 
savings can be made in respect to some present tasks?
3. What are some of the main aspects of gender division of 
labour in rural SSA? Is it true that men do almost no work
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in respect to food crops? Or does the gender division of 
labour run between different tasks? And vary between 
production intended for sale (i.e. cash crops - the largest 
of which in terms of numbers of household dependent on for 
basic cash income is probably maize with coffee second and 
yams/cocoyams/sweet potatoes third) and production intended 
primarily for household self provisioning?
4. Do most SSA households have single budgets or separate male 
and female household budgets with gender division of income 
sources (including production for household use) and of
expenditure (including use of household production)
obligations? What are some common divisions?
5. How are household labour time allocations determined in SSA
households? What are typical required inputs of women to 
activities whose income goes to male budgets (and vice
versa)?
6. Can one understand who will benefit how from specific
productivity improvements or service provision without a 
working knowledge of gender divisions of budgets and labour 
allocation obligations and of total present workloads?
7. Why is so little known in detail about these intra­
household relationships? Why is still less use made of
what is known in policy design?
8. Why are women and especially female headed households so
often "invisible" in policy design (e.g. in advice on rural 
and low income urban water programmes even though watering 
falls squarely on the female side of the gender division of 
labour as does maintenance) and in programme articulation 
(e.g. failure of extension services to address instruction 
and demonstration to women on "female" tasks or to address 
special problems - including labour shortages - of female 
headed households)?
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9. What practical programmatic responses are possible e.g:
a. more accessible basic health services and pure water 
supplies (reducing present women's workload)?
b. training women in community facility (e.g. rural 
schools, clinics, water units) maintenance?
c. pushing primary and adult education toward universal 
access (most now excluded are female so that most 
beneficiaries would be female)?
d. addressing special labour power shortages (especially in 
respect to land preparation ploughing) of female headed 
households?
e. requiring public works and supplementary employment 
programmes to hire a minimum proportion of women (e.g. 
35%)?
10. What institutional structures are needed:
a. a "Women's Ministry" with a set of projects?
b. a "women's unit" to catalyse discussion and action by 
all government units and to carry out relevant research 
plus "pilot" and "demonstration" projects?
c. specific attention at analysis, policy formulation and 
operational levels of all ministries and local 
governmental bodies to gender specific issues and to 
providing effective access for women to all programmes 
and services?
d. encouragement and support for (and listening to) 
domestic women's NGO's from community through national 
level including listening to them and sharing in 
resource mobilisation for projects prioretised and 
designed by their members?
11. Why in the 1980's have Ministries of Health in many cases
been able to "see" women; to identify their particular
requirements; to design increasingly relevant programmes?
What can one learn from this atypical (of other ministries)
case?
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1. Why are donors concerned about structural adjustment?
2. How can donors acquire the data and analytical base to make
appropriate structural adjustment proposals? At what level 
of detail?
3. How can donors relate to (in criticism, suggestions for
alteration, support to) nationally designed structural 
adjustment programmes?
4. How can consistency among donors, speed of donor response,
initial flows of funds be speeded up in respect to 
structural adjustment?
5. How can alterations in levels, makeup flexibility of donor 
financial transfers increase the ability of SSA economies 
to continue structural adjustment programmes and to achieve 
their targets?
6. How can unified national accounting/reporting systems be 
reconciled with diverse donor/lender requirements?
7. What ways exist to reconcile SSA government accountability 
to its own civil society and to external resource 
providers? To what extent can/should the external bodies 
seek to respond to/protect civil society and social group 
need, and interests of low priority to the lost government?
8. To whom are external non-governmental organisations 
actually accountable? How can host governments increase 
NGO accountability to local communities? the consistency 
of their projects with coordinated, domestically determined 
district and national priorities?
U. Role of Donors in Structural Adjustment
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1. What is the IMF's basic macroeconomic model? How does it 
relate to real (physical) output variables? Or does it?
2. Can short term programmes actually achieve an adequate 
balance between monetary demand containment and real supply 
enhancement?
3. Is the IMF's propensity to seek large initial changes
("shock treatment") wise?
4. Why do so many IMF programmes in SSA break down? Does this
suggest faulty specification and projection on the part of 
the IMF?
5. Is heavy borrowing of relatively hard, short duration
finance from the fund a prudent way to finance structural 
adjustment? If not, why has it become so common in SSA? 
If so what routes to financing genuinely short term foreign 
balance crises (superimposed on a longer term structural 
problem) are open to SSA economics permanently in the upper 
credit tranches of their IMF quotas? How does the newly
expanded SAF of the IMF relate to these questions?
6. How compatible are the Fund stabilisation and Bank
structural adjustment models (in theory and in actual 
practice in SSA)? If they are becoming more so whose
approach(es) is (are) changing, how and why?
W. The Internal Politics of Adjustment
1. Who benefits from structural adjustment? Who looses? Over
what time period?
V. The IMF'S role in Structural Adjustment
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2. How can an effective political coalition in favour of
initiating and sustaining structural adjustment be built •
up?
3. Is a transparent "social contract" setting out short and 
medium term cost and benefit division practicable?
Desirable? When? How can it be evolved/negotiated
domestically through the political process? How can it be 
negotiated/reconciled with international financial 
institution goals/conditions?
4. What are the tradeoffs between technical efficiency and
speed and political supportability and sustainability?
Does democratic discussion and participation speed or slow 
initial decision taking? Subsequent implication?
5. What are the economic costs of politically failed and/or
abandoned structural adjustment efforts? Are these 
adequately taken into account in programme design: by SSA
governments? By the IMF? By the World Bank? By bilateral 
resource transfer? If so why do the same apparently 
avoidable problems arise repeatedly - eg early, massive, 
uncompensated increases in staple grain prices?
6. How can "adjustment fatigue" be limited or contained?
7. What are the politics of bargaining for external resources?
What are the key determinants of the outcome of
negotiations and of the sustainability of that outcome?
8. How can the reality of domestic political requirements (and 
the economic, as well as human and social, costs of 
ignoring them be made clear to the Fund, Bank, bilateral 
sources of funding? How can a reasoned dialogue on what is 
politically and socially (and therefore ultimately 
economically) practicable be entered into with them?
47
9. What does the record show about the performance of 
countries with strong and widely based political decision 
taker commitment to Structural Adjustment and those 
without? What are the benefits, costs and risks of quick 
decisions (overriding significant decision takers) and a 
longer process of dialogue to reach near consensus? Of 
fairly open versus closed circle pre discussion and 
dialogue? Of ongoing evaluation of results with at least 
some candour as to failures and setbacks as well as 
progress and breakthroughs?
X. Question and Answer Session - World Bank
1. What does the World Bank see as the primary elements of
Structural Adjustment Programmes? Of longer term
transformation? How do these relate to each other? To 
short term adjustment?
2. How does the Bank view its role in/relationship with SSA 
governments in policy formulation, institutionalisation and 
phasing?
3. Why have so many SSA structural adjustment programmes 
failed to meet their targets or even collapsed:
a. failure to implement - SSA government?
b. failure to provide minimum necessary external support 
(especially import support) by external government and 
institutions?
c. inadequate easing of external debt interest and 
repayment burden?
d. continuing export terms of trade and access declines? 
Inadequate export diversification promotion and 
investment?
e. inconsistencies in policy packages and in implementation 
(i.e. faulty design) by governments and/or bank?
f, inadequate easing of external debt interest and 
repayment burden?
g. bad choices of initial steps (eg urban grain price 
boost?)?
What does Bank see as scope within structural adjustment 
programmes for employment creation, basic service 
restoration initiatives of PAMSCAD (Ghana) and/or 
Mozambique SDA types? Why is PAMSCAD a rather late 
starting, special programme approach and Mozambique-SDA 
earlier in the national rehabilitation/adjustment process, 
more closely linked to macro goals and major programmes? 
Does it matter?
What can be done to reduce the "front end loading" of costs 
and lagged appearance of benefits? This bias in structural 
adjustment - a temporal bias which is socially and 
politically damaging, deters entry into programmes and can 
lead to their premature abandoment).
What action does the Bank view as needed by SSA 
governments, Paris Club creditors, commercial bank 
creditors, bilateral development assistance bodies, itself 
in respect to reducing debt service burden to increase the 
quality of performance and reduce the incidence of collapse 
in SSA structural adjustment programmes? How can high 
opportunity costs of unpredictability of future payments 
actually to be made rather than rescheduled and of massive 
use of scarce high level personnel inherent in present one 
to two year, multi stage rescheduling process be reduced?
Does the Bank see significant further progress on 
concessional resource mobilisation for SSA as likely?
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1. What constraints do (should) real income levels, vulnerable 
group protection, regional balance, vested interests, 
preservation of morale place have on timing (how fast) and 
phasing (relative timing of costs and gains) of structural 
adjustment programmes?
2. Is the case for sharp (high cost) initial changes followed 
by gradual (moderate gain) recovery socially and 
politically viable? If - or when - it is not, will not 
such programmes either collapse or create damaging 
frictions overriding their nominal economic gain potential? 
Under what conditions is that contention valid? Too 
pessimistic?
3. Can gradual adjustment - with lesser imposition of costs at 
any one time but over a longer period - be sustained 
politically and in terms of participation and morale? If 
not, will the lesser shock impact cost be cancelled out by 
not sticking to the adjustment strategy long enough to 
achieve lasting gains?
4. What structural adjustment of the phasing of structural 
adjustment can increase early gains to provide tangible 
(socially and politically) evidence of success?
a. Restoring capacity use (e.g more incentive goods, better 
rural access to transport and markets) before 
restoration of general fixed investment levels?
b. Early provision of low cost, mass benefit programmes,
e.g in the field of extended immunisation?
c. Restoration (especially in rural areas) of basic 
education, health and water services to increase 
productive capacity, incentives, morale, acceptability 
of costs of adjustment?
d. Special programmes (possibly including limited 
transitional basic food subsidies) to shield vulnerable 
groups during the initial stages of adjustment?
Y. Phasing and Timing of Structural Adjustment - Political Economy
e. In short should programme elements like Ghana's PAMSCAD 
(primary education and health care, relocation for 
retrenched, seasonal employment, specific attention to 
poorest rural regions and urban slums) be "up front" and 
not (as in Ghana) four years "down the road"? is 
Mozambique's focus on maintaining real minimum wages, 
expanding productive employment, rehabilitating basic 
services and restoring rural family sector livelihoods a 
practicable one?
To the extent that measures like those at No. 4 would on 
existing resource availability projections reduce the pace 
of return to fiscal and external balance how can they be 
financed? Are there bilateral and UN agency sources 
willing to provide additional funding to this end? Is the 
EEC?
Can full scale structural adjustment in SSA be instituted, 
sustained, succeed in its own terms without substantial 
initial and interim net real resource (import capacity) 
transfers? If so what strategy for securing them is likely 
to work?
Given the at best marginal funding to date of most 
structural adjustment programmes in SSA relation to 
projected minimum requirements, what is the likely overall 
and per programme implication of a sharp increase in the 
number of programmes? Of additional concessional resource 
flows to central (eastern) European middle income 
countries?
Why have rapid output growth increases proved elusive even 
in relatively long running, moderately successful 
programmes (e.g Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania)? In particular 
why is reactivation of idled manufacturing capacity usually 
painfully slow?
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9. How can phasing of governance improvement on technical 
efficiency/accounting and an accountability to civil 
society/broader participation in governance and production 
fronts be coordinated with other economic and social 
adjustments/transformations?
